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We investigate  the presence of the disposition effect for 90 244 individual investors using a unique  large 
brokerage account database between 1999 and 2006. Our main results show that individual  investors 
demonstrate a strong preference for realizing their winning stocks rather than their losing ones. However, the 
fiscal impact in France appears to be moderate relative to the one observed in other countries. Taking French 
specificities such as, the way short sales are realized and the existence of tax free account (PEA account) into 
account, show that: a) the behavioral bias is not eliminated for sophisticated individual investors; b) the change 
of “tax account type” does not imply any change in investors’ behavior  
 





Nous étudions la présence d’un effet de disposition pour 90 244 investisseurs individuels français à partir d’une 
base de données de transactions individuelles sur la période 1999-2006. Les principaux résultats montrent que 
ces investisseurs ont une préférence marquée pour la réalisation de leurs gains plutôt que de leurs pertes. 
L’impact fiscal semble en France plus modéré que dans d’autres pays 
En outre, l’existence de possibilités de ventes à découvert (SRD) et de comptes PEA en France permet de mettre 
en lumière de façon originale a) la persistance de ce biais pour des investisseurs sophistiqués et b) le faible 
impact du régime fiscal sur le comportement des investisseurs. 
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Recent research in behavioral  finance  has demonstrated that investment behavior is not 
always consistent with the assumptions of perfect rationality generally made in the field. 
More precisely, this behavior has sometimes been shown to be systematically different from 
what is implied by normative models of standard finance theory.  
One of the most widely documented behavioral biases is the disposition effect. This effect 
describes the tendency, at any given point in time, to more readily sell winners than losers, 
winners and losers referring to assets that have appreciated or depreciated since purchase. In 
this framework, researchers have shown that investors who are prone to the bias earn poor 
subsequent returns on their portfolio (Odean, 1998). Of course, rational reasons can justify 
this behavior: portfolio rebalancing or higher trading costs of low priced assets, for instance. 
However, none of these reasons has been found convincing enough by researchers. 
Starting with Shefrin and Statman (1985), a number of researchers  among others have 
documented the effect: Lakonishok and Smidt (1986) on aggregate volumes, Odean (1998), 
Shapira and Venezia (2001), Dhar and Zhu (2006) on individual data
3
Our paper fits this loophole by investigating the trading records of 90 244 individual investors 
at a French discount brokerage house  between 1999 and 2006. As a result, the  first 
contribution of  this  study is to be the first one on the  French market and the most 
comprehensive in the European context
. 
 
However, if the presence of the disposition effect has been answered in some countries, no 
such research has yet been carried out in France.  
4
                                                  
3 Note that Weber and Camerer (1998) and Weber and Welfens (2006) bring experimental evidence of this biais. 
4 The only European research dealing with the disposition effect on individual data concerns  3 079 accounts 
(Weber and Welfens, 2006). 
. We find that investors show a strong preference for 3 
 
realizing paper gains rather than their paper losses and that this behavior cannot be explained, 
for instance, by a desire to rebalance portfolios.  
 
We expect some investors to be more sophisticated than others. To be precise, investors are 
ranked as sophisticated ones  if they trade  derivative assets, internationally  diversify  their 
portfolio or use short selling facilities (French SRD). Based on this original approach, our 
second contribution demonstrates that sophisticated traders are also subject to the bias which 
leads us to conclude  that  sophistication attenuates but  does not eliminate the disposition 
effect.  
At the aggregate level, we show that the impact of the tax year effect is clearly less important 
in France than in other countries. French specificities i.e the existence of PEA account (Plan 
d'Epargne en Actions) give a unique opportunity to investigate more deeply the global impact 
of tax on the selling behavior of investors on the financial market. Actually, these accounts 
offer an interesting tax framework to their holders in the sense that capital gains are tax free if 
the account has been kept for more than 5 years. In this framework, we study the disposition 
effect for holders of PEA accounts before and after the end of the 5-year period. We show that 
individual investors do not seem to change their investment behavior according to the type of 
fiscal account held (PEA or traditional). This original is our third important contribution. 
The rest of the article is organized as follows. The second section presents an overview of 
previous research on the disposition effect. Section III describes the data and introduces the 
methodology. Section IV is dedicated to the description of our main results and comments and 






II-The Disposition Effect 
 
The disposition effect is the tendency of investors to hold losers (losing stocks) too long and 
sell winners (winning stocks) too soon. This phenomenon was first documented by Shefrin 
and  Statman (1985) in a study of mutual fund performance. Subsequent papers based on 
market data (Lakonishok and Smidt, 1986; Ferris, Haugen and Makhija, 1988) showed that 
volume for winning stocks on the NYSE and the Amex exceeds that for losers.  
From a theoretical point of view
5, many explanations of the disposition effect have been 
proposed in the literature. The most common explanation is based on the assumption of 
prospect theory preferences (Tversky and Kahneman, 1979, Kahneman and Tversky 1992) 
and, more precisely, on the S-shaped valuation function assumed in this model. According to 
this theory, investors evaluate gains and losses with respect to a reference point; the buying 
price is the most commonly used  reference point. When a stock price is higher than the 
buying price (or more generally than the reference price), the investor is in the concave part of 
his valuation function and is hence risk averse. He may sell the stock if the expected return is 
perceived as too low. After a price drop, the investor is in the convex part and keeps the stock 
because he has become risk seeking. Following Shefrin and Statman (1985), some authors 
have used this argument to justify the existence of disposition investors (Odean (1998) and 
Weber and Camerer (1998), for example). In other words, when agents are risk-averse over 
gains and risk lovers over losses, they prefer to realize paper gains and to keep paper losses
6
                                                  
5 For experimental studies of this bias, see for example, Weber and Camerer (1998), Chui (2001), Weber and 
Welfens (2006) and Rubaltelli et al. (2005). 
6 Barberis and Xiong (2006) (see also Hens and Vlcek (2005)) show that the disposition effect is observed for 
some values of the expected stock return and the horizon of the investor, but they also find the opposite effect for 
other reasonable values of these parameters.  Note that Barberis and Xiong (2008) give some new theoretical 
explanation of the disposition effect based on a “realization utility”. 
.  5 
 
A second explanation is based on an irrational belief in mean reversion of stock prices, which 
states that investors believe poorer-performing stocks will rebound, and that better-performing 
stocks will decline in price. Briefly speaking, after a price increase, the investor believes that 
the probability of a price drop in the next period is higher than the one of another price 
increase (Shu et al. (2005), Weber and Camerer (1998)). 
A third group of explanations argue that the disposition effect may be due to the desire to 
rebalance portfolios or to avoid higher transactions costs on low-priced assets. However, it 
has been shown in many studies that when controlling for rebalancing and share prices, the 
disposition effect is still observed  and that the investments the investors choose to sell 
continue in subsequent months to outperform the losers they keep (see Odean (1998), Brown 
et al. (2006), for example). 
A last explanation of the disposition effect is proposed by psychologists who work on the 
theory of entrapment or escalation of commitment (Staw (1979), Brockner (1992)). In an 
investment context, the question is to know if it is better to keep a losing investment, to 
increase the stake (to break even), or to sell the losers and choose other stocks to invest in 
(Zuchel, 2001).  
Finally, the disposition effect can also refer to preferences, including the idea that investors 
seek pride and want to avoid regret when choosing investment (Shefrin and Statman (1985)). 
This interpretation has recently been developed by Muermann and Volkman (2006). The 
authors argue that loss aversion alone  cannot explain the disposition effect as shown by 
Barberis and Xiong (2006) and Hens and Vlcek (2005) and they include the anticipation of 
regret and pride in a dynamic portfolio choice setting
7
                                                  
7 For experimental evidence, see O’Curry, Fogel and Berry (2006). 
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From an empirical point of view, the disposition effect is now well documented on individual 
data. Odean (1998) was the first to study the decision process of individuals on an important 
database of 10 000 accounts with a total of 97 483 transactions between 1987 and 1993.  
He found that the proportion of realized gains is significantly higher than the proportion of 
realized losses (except in December), giving evidence of a disposition effect in individual 
investors’ behavior.  
Later studies on individual data gave rise to similar results for the behavior of employees 
(Heath et al., 1999), and for stocks in other countries than the US (Shapira and Venezia, 2001, 
for Israel, Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001, for Finland, Chen et al., 2004, for China, and Shu et 
al. (2005),  for Taiwan, Brown et al., 2006, for Australia). The disposition effect also appears 
to be positive on average but of different magnitude across countries and across investors. For 
example, Barber et al. (2007) show that Taiwanese investors are much more reluctant to 
realize their losses than U.S investors. They interpret their findings by the fact that Taiwanese 
traders exhibit a stronger belief in mean reversion than U.S traders.  
Note that at the individual level, the disposition effect could vary across individual investors. 
Concerning this level of analysis, Dhar and Zhu (2006) confirm the presence of a significant 
disposition effect on average but show that one-fifth of the investors exhibit the opposite 
behavior and that the disposition effect is stronger for less sophisticated investors. Finally, the 
disposition effect is also detected in the investment decisions of professional traders. (Shapira 




The next section presents the original and proprietary dataset over which we analyze the 
disposition effect. 
 
                                                  
8 Coval and Shumway (2005), Frino et al. (2005) and Locke and Mann (2003) obtain the same kind of results on 
different futures markets.  7 
 
III- Data and empirical design 
 
The  anonymous  data for this study comes from  Cortal Consors,  a large French discount 
brokerage house. We obtained transaction data for all active
9
In order to study the disposition effect, we extracted a dataset that only includes trades for 
common stocks. This dataset  contains  8 464 518 trades, with 4 447 678 buy orders and 
4 016 840 sell orders, made by 90 244 investors over 4 377 assets. For each stock, we build a 
file containing historical daily prices over the period 1999-2006. In this respect, securities 
ISIN codes are used to collect price data and information on splits and dividends through 
Fininfo
 accounts over the period 1999-
2006, that is a total of 9 619 898 transactions, with 5 074 732 buy orders and 4 545 166 sell 
orders, for 92 603 investors.  Data are contained in three files: trades, investors and fees. The 
trades file combines the following information for each trade: ISIN code of the asset, type of 
asset (common stocks, bonds, certificates, warrants), buy-sell indicator, sell short indicator, 
date, quantity and amount in Euros, place of quotation, account type (taxable versus tax-free 
account or French “PEA”), media used to place the order, order type. In the investors file, 
some demographical characteristics of investors are gathered: date of birth, sex, date of entry 
in and exit of the database, opening and/or closing dates of all accounts, place of living, and 
yearly number of trades. Finally, the fees file contains monthly fees paid by each investor and 
indicates whether they are trade fees or short sales fees. 
10
                                                  
9Over the period 1999-2005, active accounts are those with at least one transaction over 2 years (consecutive or 
not). For the last year of the sample, accounts are active if they hold at least one transaction over the entire year. 
, the French data provider. At this step, some trades (less than 1%) were deleted from 
the dataset because, either we did not find data corresponding to the ISIN code (534 codes out 
of 4377 ones). The final database, for which all prices are available, gathers 8 438 885 trades 
(4 426 894 purchases and 4 011 991 sales) for 90 079 investors. 
10 www.Fininfo.com 8 
 
In the context of French markets, three points should be outlined. First, individual investors 
may trade shares on a tax-free account, called PEA (Plan d’Epargne en Actions), or, as in 
other countries, on a traditional asset account. PEA accounts are very popular because banks 
mainly distribute these accounts to their customers as a first experience with trading on the 
stock market. Moreover, and more importantly for the scope of this paper, PEA accounts 
allow to realize tax-free capital gains if the account was opened at least 5 years ago. In our 
dataset, 10911 investors hold only PEA accounts and 35 598 investors hold both PEA and 
traditional accounts.  
The second point relies on the international diversification of investors’ trades. Only 9,3% of 
trades deal with non-French shares. it  is not a surprising result because of the well-
documented home-bias (Huberman, 2001). Figure 1 provides precisely the distribution  of 
transactions across regions on our dataset. At the individual level, 54% of investors realize at 
least one trade on these foreign  assets and we call them “international traders”. Third, French 
individual investors have a very easy access to short sales and 1095 investors realize all trades 
using SRD orders; we call them “SRD investors”
 11
The typical investor is a male (86,42%) and is 42 years old on average. Table 1 provides 




Figure 1 about here 
 
12
                                                  
11Note that SRD (“Système à Règlement Différé”) is a French market specificity which allows investors to 
leverage and short sell. 
12 This relatively high number of stocks per trade is mainly due to some huge trades on penny stocks. 
  460. During the period 1999-2006, investors realized  more than 90 trades 
amounting to an average of more than 3 800€ per trade (3 696€ for buy and 4 011€ for sell). 
As the median trade size, number and amount are respectively 60 assets, 22 trades and 9 
 
roughly 2000 €, we conclude that there is a considerable heterogeneity in the trading behavior 
of  investors. On average, investors are active half of the time (4 years over the 8).  
 
Table 1 about here 
 
In this paper, we use the methodology given in Odean (1998) to compute the disposition 
effect and the following example provides an explicit example. Suppose that two investors (I 
and II) are active and that 3 stocks (X, Y, Z) are quoted on the financial market. Table 2 
summarizes all investor’s trades on the whole period of study (one month for this example). 
This table contains the dates (first column) when at least one of the two investors takes a 
position (Buy or Sell). “Asset” and “Price” indicate respectively the number of assets and the 
average price of the asset during the day. Columns “type” give the investor trade indicator:  
purchase (B for Buy), sale (S for sell) or nothing (NO). “Nber” indicates the trade volume. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
Each day an investor sells securities, we determine whether the security is sold for a gain or a 
loss by comparing its selling price to its average purchase price. When the position changes 
and stocks are bought, the average purchase price is then adjusted. 
Therefore, each sale is counted as a realized gain (RG) or a realized loss (RL). Each stock in 
the portfolio at the beginning of each day that is not sold during that day is considered to be 
an unrealized (paper) gain or loss. Paper gains or losses are defined by comparing the high 
and low daily price of the stock to its average purchase price. If these daily prices are above 
their average purchase price, the trade is counted as a paper loss (PL); in the opposite case, it 
is counted as a paper gain (PG); otherwise, neither a paper gain nor a loss is accounted for. 10 
 
All gains and losses are calculated after adjusting for splits. Following Odean, we choose the 
reference price to be the average purchase price.  
To illustrate this methodology, in the example of table 2, on October the 10th, prices of X and 
Y are higher than their average purchase prices (contrary to the price of Z) and the first 
investor chooses to sell 10 stocks X and to keep his position on Y and Z.  
Then, on this date and for this investor, we compute 1 realized gain (stocks X sold), 0 realized 
loss, 1 paper gain (stocks Y) and 1 paper loss (stocks Z). Table 3 summarizes for the two 
investors, the values of RG, RL, PG, PL, for all selling days. 
Table 3 about here 
It is important to notice that the four estimates, RG, RL, PG and PL could obviously not be 
computed for portfolios containing only purchases or sales, portfolios with only one trade or 
only one asset traded and for sales for which no previous purchase was identified.  In this 
article, the final number of trades for which the preceding methodology can be applied is 
8 230 826. 
The last step of the methodology consists of using these key values (RG, RL, PG and PL) to 
compute the proportion of realized gains (PGR) and the proportion of realized losses (PLR) 


















where  ,  ,  ,  denote the number of realized gains, the number of potential gains (paper gains), 
the number of realized losses and the number of potential losses (paper losses). 11 
 
In this paper, the measure of the disposition effect is defined as the difference DE = PGR - 
PLR. When this difference takes a positive value, it indicates that investors are more prone to 
realize gains than losses. In our example, the last row of Table 3 (TOTAL) gives  RG N  = 3, 
RL N  = 2,  PG N  = 1 and  PL N   = 3. Finally, PGR = 0.75, PLR = 0.4 and DE = 0.35.  
It is important to notice that these values are computed across investors assuming that each 
sale for a gain (or a loss) and paper gain (or paper loss) on the day of the sale are separate 
independent observations.  In this context, we test the following hypothesis: 
 













) 1 ( ) 1 (
: Proportion of Gains Realized ≤ Proportion of Losses Realized  
The Z-statistic (distributed normally) is applied to test this hypothesis where:  
 
 
Note that assuming the independence at an account level (instead of at a transaction level) 
PGR, PLR and DE could be measured for each investor (instead of at an aggregate level) 
13. 
The global disposition effect is then defined as the average account disposition effect. In our 
example, Total  I and Total II  give  the values  of  ,  ,  ,      that  are used to compute  the 
disposition effect at an individual level. After basic calculations the value of the average 
disposition effect is  0.415 (0.33 for the first investor and 0.5 for the second)
14
                                                  
13 For a discussion on the limits of these measures, see for example Feng and Seasholes (2005)  
14 Contrary to our simple illustration, in order to control for independence at an account level, the sale of a stock 
is counted only if no sale has been previously counted for that stock in any account within a week before or after 
the sale date (Odean, 1998). 
.  
This simple illustration shows that the two measures of ED give obviously different results 
and even if at an aggregated level investors seem to suffer from the disposition effect, the 
disparity between investors may be very important. 12 
 
 
In the following sections, the disposition effect is first studied  globally  based on the 
assumption on independence at the transaction  level.  Then we study the presence of the 
disposition effect among sub-groups of traders. In the last section, we measure the impact of 
the tax account type on the behavior of investors and then use an individual measure of the 
disposition effect. 
 
IV – General results and discussion 
 
IV – 1 Disposition effect and sophistication 
 
In this section, we present the results at the aggregate level. Based on 4 011 991 sales, we 
compute a total of 1 998 924 disposition effects for 57 153 investors
15. For sake of simplicity, 
investors for whom a disposition effect is computed are called “investors” in the rest of the 
paper. We study the aggregate disposition effect (see tables 2 and 3 for an example) by 
considering  that  each sale that results in a realized or paper gain/loss constitutes an 
independent observation. An alternative way to study the disposition effect is to consider that 
realized/paper gains and losses are independent, not at the transaction level, but at the account 
or investor level.  In Table 4, we provide the average values of PGR, PLR and DE over 





Table 4 about here 
                                                  
15 Note that if many operations are recorded on the same day, a unique disposition effect is computed. 
16 We also use this methodology over our dataset (see figure 4 in the appendix) and find that approximately 20 
% of the investors do not exhibit any DE or exhibit the opposite behaviour (DE < 0). This result confirms the 
ones obtained by Dhar and Zhu (2006) on US individual investors. 
 13 
 
On the entire sample, the null hypothesis (PGR ≤ PLR) is rejected with a high degree of 
statistical significance. Investors are prone to the disposition effect over our sample period. 
Note that the results differ across years. For example, in 1999 the aggregate disposition effect 
is the highest (0.1078) whereas 2006 exhibits the lowest DE value (0.013). 
However, looking at the evolution of the average DE and of the ratio PGR/PLR, we cannot 
highlight any distinct monotonic trend over time. For example, PGR/PLR values gradually 
increase from 2000 to 2002, peaking in 2003 and falling off as from 2004. The ratio PGR to 
PLR is the rate at which the individual investors prefer to sell winning stocks rather than 
losing ones. On the average, a stock that is up in value is more than 60% (1.68) more likely to 
be sold that a stock that is down. These results are quite in line with those generally obtained 
in the literature: Odean (1998) and Weber and Welfens (2006) compute a ratio of 1.5 while 
Brown et al. (2006) and Chen et al. (2007) get 1.6. 
For a better understanding of the behavior of the investors, Table 5 (column 1) gives the 
average returns since the day of purchase for realized and paper gains and losses for the entire 
sample. Returns on paper gains are fourfold greater than those on realized gains. The same 
type of conclusion is obtained for losses (last two rows of Table 5). As noted by Odean 
(1998), these results seem to confirm that investors are more likely to realize smaller, rather 
than larger, gains and losses 
 
Table 5 about here 
 
We also test whether the disposition effect observed in our sample can be explained by the 
desire of individuals to rebalance their portfolios (Table 6, column 1) or to restore 
diversification (Table 6, column 2). For the first test, we eliminate any sale for which the 
entire position in a stock has not been cleared (53 502 investors sold their entire position in 14 
 
the database). To eliminate any transaction resulting from a desire to restore diversification, 
we also remove sales for which there has been a new purchase on the sale date or during the 3 
following weeks (21 days). 48 523 traders are concerned. Our results confirm previous results 
by demonstrating that traders still prefer to sell winners. The magnitude of the disposition 
effect is not reduced on this restricted sample. 
 
Table 6 about here 
 
In order to investigate the influence of traders’ sophistication on the disposition effect, we 
build different groups of traders and check whether they exhibit any disposition effect. Three 
proxies for investors skills are retained; the geographical diversification of trades (presence of 
trades outside France), the use of the French SRD (“Système à Règlement Différé”) and the 
investment in warrants.  Briefly speaking, although individual investors are not usually 
supposed to be sophisticated ones, we assume that among them, those who internationally 
diversify portfolios (or are subject to a less important home bias), trade with SRD or trade 
warrants are at least more familiar with financial markets.  
According to the ISIN of stocks, we divide investors in two categories: 40 430 among them 
only invest in French stocks, and we call them “local traders”, the others are “international 
traders”. Results in Table 7 panel I indicate that both groups are prone to the bias. More 
precisely, the disposition effect for “local traders” is 0.093 which is twofold the value of the 
disposition effect of “international traders”.  
 
Table 7 about here 
 15 
 
Note that PGR and PLR measures are dependent on the portfolio size; we could obtain a 
lower disposition bias for an individual trading frequently but realizing the same number of 
winners/ losers. We should however point out that Dhar and Zhu (2006) compare measures of 
DE over sub groups. They justify such comparisons by the relative homogeneity of portfolios 
size among groups. Therefore, we computed the number of stocks held by individuals in each 
of our sub-groups: local traders have on average 14 securities while international investors 
hold 33 stocks. Given the difference in portfolio sizes, we do not compare our measures of 
DE
17. The same argument applies to the other two proxies for sophistication (warrants and 
SRD use) although  these proxies are  not directly linked to trading behavior
18
Results in Table 7, panels II (SRD) and III (warrants), indicate that the 4 groups are prone to 
the bias and that the disposition effect appears to be slightly lower for sophisticated traders 
(DE is 0.045 for SRD investors and 0.043 for warrant investors against 0.051 and 0.055 for 
the respective non sophisticated investors).  Though  more investigation is clearly needed, 
sophistication seems to attenuate the DE which order  of magnitude is  0.04 for all 
sophisticated investors (0.048 for international traders)
  during the 
sample period as they rely on the presence of specific trades in each investor account. A 
“SRD” investor always chooses to use the leverage and short selling facility; there are 1 095 
such investors. A “warrant” investor trades warrants at least once during the sample period; 







                                                  
17 For a discussion of DE determinants, see for example Feng and Seasholes (2005). 
18 Note that “warrants” trades are excluded from our dataset. 
19 We also use the trading activity (based on the number of annual transactions) as another proxy and find 
DE=0.04 for frequent investors. We do not report these results because we think trading activity constitutes a 
proxy for experience that does not always hint to sophistication. 16 
 
IV – 2   Disposition effect and taxes 
 
In this subsection, we first analyze the existence of end-of-the-year effect on the disposition 
effect (tax impact). Secondly, with respect to French specificities, we also investigate whether 
account types and tax regime shifts influence investment behavior.  
In order to investigate whether individual investors pay attention to tax considerations at the 
end of the fiscal year, we also compute PGR, PLR and DE over the two intra year periods, 
January-November and December. Drawing on the work of Constantinides (1984), we expect 
investors to gradually increase their tax-loss selling from January to December.  Table  8 
provides the results. 
 
Table 8 about here 
 
We  test  the differences in proportions over the two sub-periods. Formally, for two 
independent samples (1) and (2), we test the following hypothesis: 
 
and  
: Proportion of Gains Realized in (2) = Proportion of Gains Realized in (1) 
’
 
: Proportion of Losses Realized in (2) = Proportion of Losses Realized in (1) 
The following statistic (normally distributed) is applied to test 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
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 where:  
 17 
 
j RG N  and 
j PG N  denote the number of realized gains and of potential gains (paper gains) in 
sample j. 
In previous studies, DE is generally negative and the PGR/PLR ratio is lower than 1 in the last 
month of the fiscal year (December in US market for Odean (1998) and June for Brown et al. 
(2006) in Australia, for example). 
In table 8, the disposition effect seems to be lower in December when compared with the 
average value of January-November but it is still positive. Tests of differences in proportions 
indicate that the following results are significant:  -Nov >   and   >  -Nov
Moreover, looking in table 8 at PGR/PLR indicates that on average, traders realize fewer 
gains and more losses in December: the ratio of PGR over PLR being 1.57 in December 
against 1.68 for the entire year. However, the fiscal impact in France appears to be moderate 
relative to the one observed in other countries as PGR/PLR  remains higher than one in 
December. 
. These tests show that 
the lower DE in December is due to an average lower PGR and a higher PLR in December. 
This result differs from Odean’s conclusion of a lower DE in December which was due to 
both significantly higher PLR and PGR in December.  
The results in Table 5 (column 2 and 3) also help to confirm the presence of a moderate fiscal 
impact at the end of the year. Returns on realized paper losses are –0,079 in December against 
-0,068 for the entire year. These results are clearly different from Odean ones who obtain a 
greater difference between these two values (-0,366 in December against -0,228). 
Finally, Figure 2 plots the average ratio of PGR/PLR on a monthly basis. We notice that 
contrary to Constantinides’ (1984) arguments, investors do not gradually decrease the rate at 




Figure 2 about here  
 
In the French case, the fiscal impact on the selling behavior of investors could be tested in an 
original way due to the tax regime of some accounts (PEA accounts). Actually, capital gains 
are tax-free for all trades occurring 5 years after the opening date of the account.  To be more 
precise, it is important to understand that fiscal exoneration occurs even if stocks were not 
kept for more than 5 consecutive years. The only legal restriction imposed before 5 years is 
that investors can’t withdraw cash resulting from sales.  For example, a capital gain on a 
round-trip trade made five years after the inception date of the account is tax-free.  
Therefore, as investors may choose to trade on both accounts, we  expect to measure the 
impact of tax on selling behavior by highlighting different behaviors on PEA accounts and 
traditional accounts. To serve our purpose, we focus our analysis on investors trading both on 
PEA and traditional accounts
20
Table 9 gives the results obtained for the 2 116 investors (Group I) at an aggregate level. 
Global results indicate that the disposition effect is clearly positive and significant before and 
.  In this context, for any holder of a PEA account, 5 years 
represents a focal point (beginning of the tax-free period).  If investors are sensitive to taxes, 
we expect buy and sell decisions to be affected by the tax shift on the PEA account after 5 
years. To control our results, we study the same behavioral patterns for the same investors on 
traditional accounts. 
We identify traders holding more than five years old PEA and traditional accounts (2 116 
investors that we call “GROUP I”) and classify trades made on these accounts according to 
their execution date. In other words, we distinguish trades that were realized before and those 
realized  after the accounts reached the focal point of five years. This ensures a good 
comparative basis for any analysis of possible different behaviors.  
                                                  
20 On the entire sample, there are 35 598 such traders. Note that there are 46 094 holders of only traditional 
accounts and 10 911 holders of only PEA in the database. 19 
 
after five years on both accounts. Accurately, on traditional accounts, the DE before five years 
is 0.076 (column 1) and 0.034 for trades made after five years (column 3). For PEA accounts 
values are 0.084 (column 2) and 0.032 (column 4). At an aggregate level we observe that DE 
decreases between the two sub-periods whatever the account type
21. Figures 3 confirms this 
result and gives a more precise illustration of the evolution of the aggregate DE with respect 
to experience (years of trading) for the 2110 investors. For example, at the end of the second 
year of trading DE is 0,056 and at the end of the seventh year of trading the value is about 
0,02. This curve could be seen as an “experience curve” and the decreasing trend could be 
linked to the role played by the number of years of trading ; the impact of this variable was 
demonstrated in previous studies (Dhar and Zhu, 2006, Shu et al. 2005, Brown et al., 2006 for 
example)
 22.  
Table 9 about here 
 
To investigate more accurately the hypothetic tax impact on selling behaviors, we compute 
the disposition effect at an individual level for the 2 116 investors belonging to Group I before 
and after the 
                                                  
21 Note that results for the 1665 investors trading only on PEA accounts and keeping this account for more than 
five years (Group II) and for the 5114 investors trading only on traditional accounts and keeping this account for 
more than five years (Group III) confirm this point (see table 12 in the appendix). 
22 Note that the decrease of DE is essentially imparted to the decrease of PGR, investors seems to correct this 
bias in an asymmetrical way.  
 
 birthday of both accounts. 
The results for these investors are given in Table 10. Accurately, on traditional accounts, the 
DE before five years is 0.159 and 0.1 for trades made after five years. For PEA accounts 
values are 0.179 and 0.101.  This table  confirms  the decrease of the individual average 
disposition effect after 5 years on the two account types and again highlights the results 
obtained at the aggregate level.  20 
 
However, to control for any global compensation between investors, we conduct a Wilcoxon 
signed rank test of individual DE differences. 
This  test uses  both the information on the direction and the relative magnitude of the 
differences within pairs of an identical trader average DE. For two distributions X and Y, the 
null hypothesis of the test is the following:  
 
: X and Y are samples from populations with same continuous distributions. 
Table 10 about here 
 
Figure 3 about here 
 
Table 11 gives the results of the tests for the differences in distributions between types of 
accounts and detention duration. We denote (A) [resp. B] the distribution of the individual DE 
for trades over PEA before 5 years [resp. after 5 years] and (C) [resp. D] is the distribution of 
DE for trades on traditional account before 5 years [resp. after 5 years]. V is the number of 
ranks of positive differences. Note that as N=2116 is a large sample size, the number of the 
ranks of positive differences, V, is approximately normal. 
The two first columns (A/B and C/D) show that individual distributions before and after are 
significantly different given account types. The behavior of investors seems to be clearly 
different as experience increases; this confirms the importance of learning already highlighted 
at an aggregate level (see figure 3). The test on B/D distributions allows us to reject the tax 
argument for the PEA account. Actually, in the period of different taxation between both 




Table 11 about here 
V Conclusion 
 
We provide first and original results on the behavior of investors in the French context. On a 
large and proprietary anonymous database provided by Cortal Consors, a French broker, we 
find strong evidence that the disposition effect is observed for different categories of investors 
and for all time periods. Moreover this mistaken behavior does not seem to be motivated by a 
desire to rebalance portfolios.  
As we expect some particular traders to be more sophisticated than others, based on original 
proxies (international diversification, SRD use, for example)  we demonstrate that 
sophistication does not eliminate the existence of a disposition bias.  
In this paper we conduct two tests of the impact of taxes on the selling behavior. First, at an 
aggregate level we find that investors are less prone to the disposition effect in December than 
during the rest of the year (due to a higher PGR and a lower PLR). Moreover, investors seem 
to realize losses of slightly stronger magnitude in December. However, unlike previous 
studies, DE is still positive (and PGR/PLR is higher than 1) in the last month of the fiscal year 
(Odean (1998), Brown et al.  (2006), for example). Secondly, an analysis of a French 
specificity, i.e. the existence of tax free accounts (PEA more than 5 years old) allows us to 
demonstrate that accounts tax regimes have no impact on selling behavior. 
Finally, this work could be extended at least in order to highlight characteristics of individual 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics on  investors 
This table contains results based on 8 438 885 trades (4 426 894 purchases and 4 011 991 sales) for 90 079 
investors over 1999-2006. “Age” (in years) is computed on the 01/01/1999, “Activity over 1999-2006” is the 
number of investors active accounts : active accounts are  those with at least one transaction over 2 years 
(consecutive or not). “trade amount / investor” [resp. Total Nb of trades/investor] is the total euro amount [Nb of 
trades] traded by investors over 1999-2006. 
 
Variables  Mean  Std Dev.  25%  50%  75%   99% 
Age  41.73  14.8  30  39  52  78 
Assets / trade   460.24  4486.10  23  60  200  7000 
Activity over 1999-2006  4.28  2.062  3  4  6  8 
Trade amount/investor (€)             
Buy   3696.90  9373.90  1168.18  1961.28  4450.41  24299.19 
Sell  4011.24  10387.02  1203.71  2188.86  4994.84  27327.46 
Total Nb of trades/investor  93.68  354.45  6  22  74  1099 
             

















Asia and other 
countries 0.3%26 
 
Table 2 Trades realized by investors 
      Inv. I    Inv. II   
Dates  Asset  Price  Type  Nber  Type  Nber 
10/1  X  25  B  40  B  50 
  Y  10  B  50  B  65 
  Z  30  B  20  NO  / 
10/10  X  40  S  10  B  25 
  Y  15  NO  /  B  15 
  Z  20  NO  /  NO  / 
10/31  X  45  S  10  S  40 
  Y  8  S  5  S  10 























Table 3 Key values for the two investors 
  RG  RL  PG  PL 
INV I         
10/10  1  0  1  1 
10/31  1  1  0  1 
Total I  2  1  1  2 
INV II         
10/31  1  1  0  1 
Total II  1  1  0  1 


























Table 4 The disposition effect 
This table contains results based on 4 011 991 sales over 1999-2006; 1 998 924 disposition effects are computed 
for 57 153 investors.  ,  ,  , 
 
 denote the number of realized gains, the number of potential gains (paper gains), the 
number of realized losses and the number of potential losses (paper losses).  PGR  (resp.  PLR) denotes  the 
proportion of realized gains (resp. the proportion of realized losses ratios). DE “disposition effect” is defined as 
PGR - PLR 
Entire 
Sample 
1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
RG N   2044740  270763  484745  192737  133635  199390  199570  257344  306556 
PG N   14408013  1046046  2705794  1215168  798559  1167386  1687904  2669883  3117273 
RL N   1361264  96310  309986  211637  151656  134930  147961  137532  171251 
PL N   17076433  880578  3271772  2644645  2174947  2157664  1974155  1893423  2079250 
PGR  0,124  0,206  0,152  0,137  0,143  0,146  0,10  0,088  0,089 
PLR  0,073  0,098  0,086  0,074  0,065  0,059  0,069  0,067  0,076 
PGR / PLR  1,68  2,10  1,77  1,85  2,2  2,47  1,45  1,31  1,17 
DE  0,050  0,1078  0,065  0,063  0,078  0,087  0,036  0,020  0,013 




Table 5  Average returns 
  Entire sample  Jan-Nov  Dec 
Return on realized gains   0.1116449  0.1116082  0.1120379 
Return on paper gains  0.4019417  0.4066277  0.3517965 
Return on realized losses  -0.0681329  -0.0670614  -0.0795994 
Return on paper losses  -0.2421513  -0.2424635  -0.2388105 
 













Table 6 Portfolio rebalancing 
This table contains results based on 4 011 991 sales over 1999-2006; 1 998 924 disposition effects are computed 
for 57 153 investors. First column contains results when transactions associated to a sold of entire position are 
keep. Second column contains result when sales for which there has been a new purchase on the sale date or 
during the 3 following weeks are removed. PGR (resp. PLR) denotes the proportion of realized gains (resp. the 
proportion of realized losses ratios). DE “disposition effect” is defined as PGR - PLR.  
  Entire Position sold  No purchase 3 weeks after 
sale 
PGR  0.143  0.132 
PLR  0.083  0.080 
PGR / PLR  1.72  1.65 
DE  0.060  0.052 
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Table 7 DE for groups 
This table contains results based on 4 011 991 sales over 1999-2006; 1 998 924 disposition effects are computed 
for 57 153 investors. “Local” column contains results for 41 272 investors who only invest in French stocks. 
“SRD” column contains results for 1 095 investors who only use the SRD French system. “Warrant” column 
contains results for 11 460 investors who invest in warrants.  ,  ,  , 
 
 denote the number of realized gains, the 
number of potential gains (paper gains), the number of realized losses and the number of potential losses (paper 
losses). PGR (resp. PLR) denotes the proportion of realized gains (resp. the proportion of realized losses ratios). 
DE “disposition effect” is defined as PGR - PLR.  
Panel I  Panel II  Panel III 
Local   International   SRD  Others  Warrant  Others 
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Table 8 DE over intra year periods 
This table contains results based on 4 011 991 sales over 1999-2006; 1 998 924 disposition effects are computed 
for 57 153 investors. The data are partitioned into 3 different year periods; entire year, [January-November], 
December. PGR (resp. PLR) denotes the proportion of realized gains (resp. the proportion of realized losses 
ratios). DE “disposition effect” is defined as PGR - PLR).  
  Entire Year  Jan-Nov  December 
PGR  0.124  0.125  0.124 
PLR  0.073  0.073  0.079 
PGR/PLR  1.68  1.71  1.57 
DE  0.050  0.051  0.044 
Z-stat  496.51  482.32  134.91 
0 H T for PGR  -5.374  2.314  -0.011 
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Table 9: DE before and after 5 years for group I (Aggregate DE) 
This table contains results for investors trading simultaneously on PEA and traditional accounts and holding both 
accounts more than five years. Transactions are classified in two categories (realized before or after five years). 
,  ,  , 
 
 denote the number of realized gains, the number of potential gains (paper gains), the number of realized 
losses and the number of potential losses (paper losses). PGR (resp. PLR) denotes the proportion of realized 
gains (resp. the proportion of realized losses ratios). DE “disposition effect” is defined as PGR - PLR.  
  CPT  PEA  CPT  PEA 
  < 5 years   < 5 years   > 5 years   > 5 years  
RG N   79081  67015  91137  62455 
PG N   472676  419688  827693  758425 
RL N   47924  35845  59222  37382 
PL N   664230  637128  855285  816969 
PGR  0.143  0.138  0.099  0.076 
PLR  0.067  0.053  0.065  0.044 
PGR/PLR  2.130  2.585  1.532  1.739 
DE  0.076  0.084  0.034  0.032 




















Table 10: DE at an individual level before and after 5 years for group I  
This table contains results for investors trading both on PEA and traditional accounts and holding both accounts 
more than five years. Transactions are classified in two categories (realized before or after five years) and DE is 
computed at an individual level. PGR (resp. PLR) denotes the proportion of realized gains (resp. the proportion 
of realized losses ratios). DE “disposition effect” is defined as PGR - PLR. 
 
  Numbers  Mean  Standard deviation 
PEA < 5 years (A)  2116  0.179  0.211 
 
PEA > 5 years (B)  2116  0.101 
 
0.192 




















Figure 4: DE distribution at an individual level for investors holding PEA and traditional accounts before 






















Table 11: Wilcoxon signed rank test for the differences in distributions A, B, C and D. 
This table contains results for Wilcoxon signed rank test for investors trading on PEA and traditional accounts 
and holding both accounts more than five years. (A) [resp. B] denotes the distribution of individual level of DE 
for trades over PEA before 5 years [resp. after 5 years]. (C) [resp. D] denotes the distribution of DE for trades on 
traditional account before 5 years [resp. after 5 years]. V is the number of the ranks of positive differences. 
  A/B  C/D  A/C  B/D 






















































































































CPT < 5 ans             
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